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Introduction
The aim of this paper is to propose a framework and a set of core indicators for analysing electricity sector reform in developing countries. A review of the literature (Jamasb et al. 2004) concludes that rigorous empirical and policy-relevant evidence on the performance and determinants of electricity reform in these countries is rather limited. The evidence that is available is derived from different models, varying indicator and variable definitions, and exclusive data sets making solidifying and extension of these empirical studies difficult. In addition, the robustness of some of the empirical evidence is unclear requiring further careful data analysis, model specification and sensitivity analysis (see e.g. Mukherjee et al., 1998; Leamer 1983; 1985) .
The proper study of economic reform requires an analysis of its impact and an assessment of the role of those factors that were influential in determining its outcome.
Any such analysis generally involves measuring (and thereby quantifying) specific aspects of cause and effect. Almost invariably, this involves using both quantitative and qualitative indicators.
Infrastructure industry liberalisation is a key part of the economic reform agenda.
Electricity reform affects industry structure, governance and ownership and has a significant impact on its economic, social and environmental dimensions. It is, therefore, important to assess the impact of reform and its determining factors.
However, although there have been attempts in recent years to develop indicators in sustainable development, agriculture, environment and health, notably by international organisations, far less attention has been paid to the development of appropriate indicators for infrastructure industries reform in general and electricity s ector in particular (see e.g. UN, 2001; Bossel, 1999; OCED, 2002; IAEA-IEA, 2002; von Schrinding, 2002; Atkinson et al., 2002) . Bacon (1999) who defines and surveys some key steps in electricity reform for a large number of developing countries.
The re are some key differences between developed and developing countries that have to be taken into account, namely:
i.
The expected direction of price changes in developed and developing countries are often different. In many developing countries, residential customers are subsidised by industrial users while the reverse holds in some developed countries. Consequently, the expected direction of price changes from reform depends on the starting point.
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ii. Developed market economies (DMEs) and transition economies h ave nearcomplete electrification but in many developing countries large rural and some urban groups are not connected to the electricity supply.
iii. In many developing countries, technical and non-technical energy losses in the transmission and distribution networks are high compared to DMEs.
iv. In many developing countries, the high level of non-payment has an adverse effect on the financial health of the sector.
v. In many developing countries, capacity shortages, poor utilisation of existing capacity and unserved demand result in significant economic loss.
vi.
In developing countries, regulatory credibility, institutional weaknesses and political interference are more important drivers of private investment in the sector than in developed countries.
This paper develo ps a framework and a set of core indicators for electricity sector reform in less developed countries (LDCs) that can help facilitate reform representation and comparison. A common reference framework also increases comparability of analysis and knowledge. Section 2 discusses the desirable properties of indicators, Section 3 explains the criteria for indicators, Section 4 is a conceptual discussion of the framework and typology of indicators, Section 5 presents the core indicators for electricity sector reforms and Section 6 contains the conclusion and possible directions for future work.
Properties of indicators
Electricity sector reform involves various sectoral, economic, social and environmental dimensions. In order to capture and represent the many dimension of reform, a variety of indicators must be identified, defined and then measured within the proper context.
This section briefly discusses the main properties of these indicators and some related issues. EBRD, 2001 ).
Indicators as proxies
Reform indicators can assume different roles depending on the particular setting or type of analysis in which they are used. For example, the extent of reform expressed as an index may be the result of the quality of economic management or a country's institutional endowment; the same indicator could also be used as the determinant of a performance measure or indicator.
In addition, indicators are often used as proxies for aspects of reforms that are not directly observable and can be interpreted in a variety of different ways, e. g. levels of electricity demand or generating capacity generally represent the size of the sector, but total installed generating capacity (publicly and privately-owned) has been used as proxy for private investments in reformed sectors (Bergara and Spiller, 1997) . Also, where there are extensive electrification programs, consumption may be interpreted as proxy for access to service. Indeed, industrial consumption has been used as a proxy for political influence (see Zelner and Henisz, 2000) . Ultimately, appropriateness and accuracy of findings based on proxy indicators depend on the extent to which the indicators represent reality. 
Stock vs. flow indicators
Criteria for selection of indicators
Measurability
For an indicator to be useful it needs to be based on a clear definition and to be measurable. This is equally important whether it is expressed in physical, monetary or 
Essentiality and complementarity
Collection and analysis of the range of data needed for a thorough study of electricity reform requires an efficient allocation of limited data. Therefore individual core indicators should reflect useful information that is essential to the evaluation of some important aspect of reform. When identifying and defining the core indicators, it is important to view them as part of a wider system with various inter-relationships and feedback loops. While an individual indicator provides insight into some essential aspect of reform, the core indicators should collectively represent the reform system, plus the broader framework within which it resides and operates.
Reform model and typology of indicators
Framework for analysis of electricity sector reforms
Electricity sector reforms are multi-faceted activities with inte racting factors and a variety of impacts. The process generally involves a set of concrete steps or measures based on a specific model of reform. At one level, these measures involve structural and organisational changes to the industry, and at another level there is a requirement for appropriate institutional arrangements such as legislation and new agencies.
In addition, sector endowments and characteristics such as size, resource mix, historical development, define the initial market structure and starting point and can influence the reform path and outcome. Market structure is then influenced by various measures, such as unbundling of vertically integrated enterprises, as well as institutional factors such as regulatory authorities and legislation.
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The multi-faceted nature of reform results in a variety of outcomes so effectiveness and impact can be measured through different performance indicators, e. g. operating efficiency or increased investment. There can also be linkages between sectoral performance and the driving forces that trigger reform. These forces can be internal (e.g. poor sector performance) or external (e.g. foreign debt). Figure 1 illustrates the main aspects of reforms and their inter-relationships. This model is broadly along the lines of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm of industrial organisation. The remainder of this section outlines these aspects of reform in some detail and is heavily based on Jamasb et al. (2004) .
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Motivation for reform
Actual reform steps, their sequence, and ultimately the reform performance, may be influenced by the motives (e.g. privatisation proceeds) behind the decision to reform.
High electricity price levels may be an important driving force. Joskow (1998) points out that, in the US, states with the highest electricity prices were most likely to implement reform. The main differences in reform issues, in both developing and developed countries, are often rooted in the determinants and driving forces behind reform.
In developing countries, the macroeconomic crisis of the 1980s created the need for a regime of fiscal responsibility. A combination of high levels of inflation, increasing debt burden and deterioration of the quality of public services, spurred political support for the liberalisation of infrastructure industries. Tariffs kept artificially low for antiinflationary purposes meant that electricity utilities' self-financing capacity was increasingly eroded during the 1980s, affecting both investment and quality of service.
Privatisation would improve not only the financial health of the sector, but would also increase revenue for state treasuries, so helping to reduce and restructuring public debt.
In addition, new investment would be undertaken by the private sector.
The need to ensure expansion of capacity is of special importance to less developed countries where there are 1.7 billion people without access to electricity (WRI, 2002) , and social and environmental considerations need to be integrated into reform design.
The pressure for reform from donor agencies also reinforced the move towards liberalisation.
Key reform measures
The electricity industry is a network comprising separate but connected and closely coordinated, potentially competitive and natural monopoly activities. Also, his torical development, institutional features and the resource characteristics of power sectors can differ considerably across countries. Although there is a substantial variability in
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ii. Enactment of an electricity reform law;
iii. Regulatory reform, including adoption of incentive regulation for the natural monopoly network activities;
iv. Establishment of an independent regulator; v.
Unbundling of vertically-integrated utilities into generation, transmission, distribution and supply activities, and where necessary horizontal splitting;
vi. Provision of third party access to networks;
vii. Establishment of a competitive wholesale generation market;
viii. Liberalisation of the retail supply market;
ix. Privatisation of electricity assets;
x. Definition of rules concerning consumer protection, allocation of energy subsidies, and stranded costs.
A World Bank survey on the state of energy reform in developing countries focused on six key steps: (i) corporatisation or commercialisation of the core utility; (ii) enactment of an 'Energy Law'; (iii) establishment of an independent regulatory authority; (iv) restructuring of the core utility; (v) private investment in greenfield sites; and (vi) privatisation (Bacon, 1999) . The survey suggests a logical sequence of reform steps in which the most common (because logically the first) step is corporatisation and commercialisation of the publicly owned utility, and the least common (or logically final) step is privatisation. It should be noted that not all the above reform elements will be appropriate in all countries. For example, a particular issue that arises is whether smaller systems require vertical separation and third-party-access.
Market structure
In our conceptual model of reform, the market structure component refers to the wider framework within which the interaction of supply and demand for electricity takes place. Market structure at the time of reform is the result of the historical development
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In the course of the reform process, the initial market structure is subject to changes induced by the various reform measures and institutions within the sector. Sectoral structure has a direct impact on the behaviour of market actors and consequently on performance. Changes in the structure can take time to implement and are often opposed by vested interests. It is, therefore, important that the appropriate design is envisaged from the start. At the same time, shortcomings in the structure may increase the need for intervention and rules that tend to be imperfect substitutes and increase uncertainty.
Institutional factors
Institutional factors refer to the sector-level legal and regulatory frameworks that influence and support continuity of reform. An electricity act or law is generally recognised as a prerequisite for implementation, and most market -oriented reforms involve establishing independent regulatory agencies for overseeing the functioning of the sector and for protecting the rights of consumers.
Effective regulatory practice requires clarity of the regulator's mandate and clarity of the rules defining their relationship with other bodies, such as the competition commission (or anti-monopoly agency) and relevant ministries. The degree of independence and the powers of the regulators to perform their t asks are often interpreted as an indicator for political commitment to the reform process on the part of the decision-makers.
Sector endowments
Specific reform measures and some aspects of market structure and the institutional framework may be chosen as variables. However these choices, and ultimately the sector performance, are also influenced by the sector's endowments. Factors such as the
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Sector performance
Reform performance can be evaluated along several dimensions. Private ownership, competition, and regulatory reform should improve technical performance by improving capacity utilisation, operating efficiency, labour productivity and energy losses. A key motivation for reform in developing countries is to attract private capital to reduce the burden on the general budget and to accelerate the pace of investme nt in new capacity.
Domestic and international private investment, as well as public investment, will indicate the extent to which this is achieved and also indicate the significance of private sector participation.
Price changes are likely to be the most important factor for consumers, though in some countries service reliability may be even more important. Price changes measure the extent to which productivity gains have been transferred to consumers. Real price increases may not be undesirable if they had been too low and had required a subsidy.
Successful reforms should improve revenue collection. The costs of an unreliable service are generally rather high so improvement in the quality of service is an important performance indicator.
External reform impacts
The electricity sector is capital intensive, crucial for economic activity and consumer welfare, and gives rise to significant environmental concerns. Changes in the structure, operation and performance may, therefore, have wide impacts, both on the environment and on the budget. The main economic impacts of reform are associated with investment. In many developing countries, demand for electricity is growing rapidly and the required investment puts a strain on public budgets. Also, the dead-weight loss associated with public funding can be relatively high (Beato and Laffont, 2002) compared to cost-recovering tariffs that allow debt financing. Private investment can
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reduce the pressure on public finance and release budgetary funds for other, more pressing, social and economic needs.
The social impact of electricity reform can be measured by welfare change resulting from price and consumption change, allowing for the public sector budgetary impact (the marginal cost of raising taxes or reducing public expenditure elsewhere). One major social benefit in poorer countries may be the extension of electrification to currently unserved groups. In addition, reforms have environmental impacts through changes in generation mix and energy use patterns. The effec t of reform on fuel and technology choices can result in significant changes in emissions of greenhouse gasses and pollutants.
Core electricity reform indicators
General
This section outlines a wide range of indicators that reflect key aspects of the state and development of electricity reform. The core indicators, highlighted in bold, are deemed essential and represent the most important (e.g. controllable operating and maintenance costs rather than labour costs) or the preferred alternatives (e.g. num ber of customer minutes lost rather than the number of interruptions).
Each group of indicators also includes non-core but potentially useful indicators.
Although some non-core indicators are difficult to measure, where they are available, they may be useful for in-depth and detailed studies. Some indicators can be modified to address specific issues. The organising principle for the different categories is similar to that of the individual components of the general reform model described in Section 4 and range from firm-level to high-level country factors through sector-level indicators.
The main body of core indicators are sector-specific and relate to the main aspects of reform. They also reflect some features of energy and electricity resources. Key steps 
Policy relevance of core reform indicators
In a review of the literature, Jamasb et al. (2004) examine the existing studies based on a variety of questions and hypotheses using different methods and sets of variables. The review also outlines an array of further relevant questions that have not yet been thoroughly investigated. In keeping with the essentiality criteria, core reform indicators should be relevant to important reform issues. This subsection presents a case for a set of core indicators that can help achieve this aim.
It is important to note that the core reform indicators can be used in a variety of ways: as simple presentations of the current state of affairs, as trends over time and for comparisons. Clearly, there is a need for a well-defined, consistent and comparable set of indicators. More importantly, the indicators may also be used to answer policy and research questions or test specific hypotheses. This section is primarily concerned with the latter in more formal and structured analytical settings. Broadly, there are three approaches to analysing electricity reform: (i) econometric methods, (ii) efficiency and productivity analysis methods, and (iii) individual or comparative case studies.
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Econometric studies are best suited to the analysis of well-defined issues and the testing of hypotheses through statistical analysis of reform determinants and performance. Single or multi-country case studies are suitable when in -depth investigation or qualitative analysis is needed. This approach provides the methodological flexibility required for these types of investigations and is particularly useful for exploring processes. In addition, case studies are the obvious choice where a combination of different tasks, such as in cost-benefit analysis, is required. They may also lead to the development of hypotheses which can later be tested using more formal cross-country quantitative analysis.
In the following, we outline a selected number of important and current reform-related policy issues in the form of general research questions or hypotheses. Although the policy questions outlined here are by no means exhaustive, they do illustrate the practical relevance of the core reform indicators and their use in evaluating and
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analysing some of the most pressing issues facing reforming countries and international development agencies.
i.
Higher econom ic and governance indicators, as well as independent regulation and cost-reflective pricing, lead to higher private investment.
Private sector investment constitutes the cornerstone of market-oriented electricity reforms. However, the marked decline in recent years of interest among international investors indicate reform vulnerability in developing countries to macroeconomic volatility and weaknesses in political and economic governance and institutions (Harris, 2003) . The significance of these factors has direct policy relevance for many reforming countries and for international development organisations. This type of question can best be addressed by cross-country analysis using econometric methods. The main core indicators for the analysis with reference to the components of our reform model are investments (Table V) , country-level factors (Table VII) , sector regulation (Table IV) , economic factors (Table VIII) , and social aspects (Table IX) .
ii. There is a system size below which vertical separation and competition is not effective or not worthwhile, and a level of institutional and governance endowment below which private participation is not feasible.
It is generally recognised that reform design should take the specific characteristics of the sector into account. However, this notion is often expressed in general, rather than specific terms. Two factors that characterise many reforming developing countries are small system size and very weak institutions.
Countries with small systems may have inherent limitations with regards to the introduction of effective competition. Also, the poorest countries tend to exhibit the weakest levels of institutional development so are regarded by private investors as too risky or commanding high-risk premiums. This type of question may be addressed by cross-country analysis using econometric or comparative case studies. The main core indicators for this analysis with reference to the components of our reform model are market structure indicators (Table III) , key reform steps (Table II) and various country-level indicators. (Table   II) , resource mix and endowments indicators (Table I) , and country-level indicators (Table VII) .
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iv. Incentive regulation and privatization improve cost and technical efficiency in electricity distribution networks.
In general, this type of analysis is best addressed through efficiency and productivity analysis at company level. These techniques are used to determine firms. In addition, the main physical characteristics of the system need to be accounted for, namely, the length of network, transformers, units of electric energy delivered, system losses, maximum system simultaneous demand, and number and composition of the utilities' customers (Table VI. ).
v.
Welfare economic effects of reform vary across income groups, and ineffective regula tion prevents the gains from reform from being passed onto customers.
Reform and privatization are expected to lead to tangible benefits for consumers.
However, in many developing countries there are indications that public acceptance of privatization programmes has declined in recent years (Lora and Panizza, 2002) . This may be partly the result of ineffective regulatory frameworks for ensuring that customers benefit from efficiency improvements
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and that vulnerable income groups are protected. This type of question can be addressed through case studies involving cost-benefit analysis and distributional impacts. The main core indicators with reference to the components of our reform model are price and consumption data for income groups (Table IX) , changes in access and quality of service (Table V) , regulatory framework (Table   IV) , and where possible environmental impacts of reforms (Table X) . ? Proven reserves / annual production ratio The indicators can be used in general purpose monitoring of reform progress, as well as in empirical studies using econometric, efficiency and case study analysis of individual countries and cross-country comparisons.
Electricity sectors indicators I. Sector endowments and characteristics
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II. Key Reform Steps Focus area
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In the first instance, mapping the main sources of data can follow the proposed framework and indicators as some of these will be readily available from open sources.
A glance at the tables in section 5.3 suggests that most of the data under sector endowments and characteristics (Table I) , macro-level indicators (Table VII) and environmental impacts (Table X ) is available at the country level. It also appears that significant amounts of data have been collected on key reform steps (Table II) , market structure (Table III) , regulation, governance and institutions (Table IV) and economic impacts (Table VIII) . However, the data needs to be regularly updated and there does not seem to have been a sustained effort at the level of the World Bank and other international development and finance organisations to do this.
The areas where most work on data collection, extension and standardisation needs to be done would appear to be on sector performance indicators (Table V) and firm-level indicators (Table VI) . Data for some of the missing indicators may be collected with relative ease through surveys, and the proposed framework described in this paper facilitates the design of such surveys. For some indicators, the practicality of collecting the data needs to be assessed given the significant potential collection cost; some of the 
